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Abstract: In recent years, the quantitative study of conflict has increasingly focused on 
small-scale and/or localized conflicts in the developing world. In this paper, we analyze 
and critically reflect upon a major methodological shortcoming of many studies in this field 
of research. We argue that by using group- or macro-level empirical data and modelling 
techniques, while at the same time theoretically underpinning observed empirical 
associations with individual-level mechanisms, many of these studies risk committing an 
ecological fallacy. The individual-level mechanism on which many studies rely concerns 
the presence of grievances which mobilize people to participate in contentious politics. 
This motivational approach was also present in early studies on protest mobilization in 
Western societies, which often relied on similar research designs. However, subsequent 
advances in this literature and the use of methods that were targeted more directly at 
the individual level uncovered that grievances alone cannot explain mobilization and that 
organizational capabilities and complex psychological mechanisms of belonging also form 
part of the puzzle. While drawing on conflict events as well as survey data from Africa, we 
demonstrate empirically that here, as well, inferring micro-level relations and dynamics from 
macro-level empirical models can lead to erroneous interpretations and inferences. Hence, 
we argue that to improve our understanding of conflict mobilization in the developing world, 
especially for conflicts with low levels of violence, it is necessary to substantially expand our 
methodological toolbox beyond macro-level analyses.
Key words: ecological fallacy, methodological individualism, conflict studies, social 
movements, protests
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IntroDuctIon
In recent years, the conflict literature has increasingly focused on relatively small-
scale forms of conflict, such as communal conflicts, protests and riots occurring in 
the developing world. Many studies in this field have presented empirical evidence 
which seems to suggest that these forms of conflict – sometimes collectively 
referred to as “social disorder events” – are driven by resource scarcity dynamics 
and considerations (e.g. Hendrix & Salehyan, 2012; Weinberg & Bakker, 2015). 
Methodologically, it is noteworthy that most social disorder studies tend to use 
individual-level theory to substantiate relations between group- or macro-level 
empirical variables. In particular, grievance-based theories, usually drawing on 
Gurr’s (1974) concept of relative deprivation, are often used to theoretically 
underpin the empirical link between different scarcity measures and the incidence 
or risk of a particular social disorder event occurring.
The empirical strategy of using macro-level data and modelling approaches 
is similar to that used in many quantitative studies which aim to explain the 
determinants of the onset of civil war. These studies similarly tend to operationalize 
motivations by means of macro-level empirical data. A classic example in this 
respect is the study by Collier and Hoeffler (2002), in which they use macro-models 
to test the significance of greed versus grievance motivations in joining a rebellion 
or engaging in conflict. Arguably, the main reason why many quantitative civil-
war studies have opted for this empirical strategy is the lack of reliable micro-
level motivational data in civil-war settings. The practical difficulties of collecting 
individual-level data, coupled with a high risk of social desirability bias among 
rebel respondents may support the use of macro-level data in civil-war studies. 
However, by opting for this methodological approach, civil-war studies, such as 
Collier and Hoeffler’s, risk committing an ecological fallacy. 
The same ecological fallacy risk applies to many social disorder studies which 
rely on grievance theory to explain the causal mechanisms between a macro-level 
predictor and protest occurrence. Furthermore, while macro-level data may be 
useful in civil-war studies because they are potentially less prone to measurement 
error, this rationale is more difficult to uphold in the case of protest mobilization. 
Indeed, studies focusing on social movements and protest participation in Western 
contexts have often successfully used empirical methods that direct attention to 
the individual, such as interviews and surveys. By doing so, theories on protest 
dynamics have advanced substantially in this literature and solely grievance-based 
theories have been discredited as too simplistic. Individual-level data collection 
exercises on protest behaviour may still be challenging in developing contexts, 
but they constitute a realistic alternative to macro-level modelling approaches. 
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Moreover, they offer the opportunity to overcome current ecological fallacy 
problems. 
In this paper, we support this argument by analyzing the extent to which the 
risk of ecological fallacies is present among recent quantitative social disorder 
studies that specifically focus on explaining the emergence of protests and 
riots. In our empirical example, we focus on Africa because of the availability 
of both protest event datasets and a set of nationally representative surveys (i.e. 
Afrobarometer surveys) that contain a number of useful questions concerning 
people’s protest and mobilization behavior. Although limited to Africa, we argue 
that the methodological issues we uncover have a wider appeal and importance. 
By relying on both macro-level empirical data on protest events as well as micro-
level data on protest participation, we are able to show empirically that individual-
level inferences drawn from group- or macro-level empirical associations are 
not necessarily supported by actual micro-level data, and can therefore lead to 
ecological fallacies. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, the mismatch between 
empirical data and theoretical models in recent social disorder studies is explored 
and contextualized within the larger conflict mobilization literature. In Section 
3, the notion of ecological fallacies and their presence in conflict studies is 
explained in more detail. In Section 4, the argument is illustrated empirically with 
concrete examples based on the social disorder literature. The empirical analyses 
demonstrate that there can be different dynamics and relations between key 
variables at both levels of analysis. Section 5 concludes and focuses specifically 
on both the theoretical strengths and data challenges implied by a methodological 
individualist perspective. 
EcoLogIcAL fALLAcy rIsKs In socIAL DIsorDEr stuDIEs
current research on social disorder in the developing world
In recent years, the focus of the quantitative conflict literature has increasingly 
shifted away from the study of civil wars towards more localized and small-scale 
conflicts and episodes (Bernauer & Gleditsch, 2012) or so-called social disorder 
events (Hendrix & Salehyan, 2012). One strand of this literature has focused in 
particular on how different scarcity factors can increase the risk of social disorder 
events in the developing world. For instance, Hendrix and Haggard (2015) have 
investigated the impact of international food price fluctuations on the risk of 
social disorder events in major African and Asian cities with regime type as an 
intermediary variable. The authors state that the “theoretical links between price 
movements and protest can be grounded in traditions of research on protest going 
Ask. Vol. 28 (1, 2019): 21–4224
back to the relative deprivation hypothesis” (Ibid., p.145, emphasis added). The 
authors thus use an individual grievance logic to theoretically underpin their 
empirical analysis. Similarly, Smith (2014) analyses urban social conflict in Africa 
and investigates whether domestic food price indices are causally associated 
with social unrest. He also assumes that mobilization is grievance-based when he 
states that “sharp unexpected increases may overwhelm coping mechanisms and 
increase grievances and the propensity to engage in unrest activities” (Ibid., p.682, 
emphasis added). Weinberg and Bakker (2015) use domestic-level food prices and 
investigate their effect on social unrest (i.e. riots, anti-government demonstrations, 
and government crises) based on the Cross-National Time-series Data Archive. 
They also mainly theorize their causal links via Gurr’s relative deprivation theory: 
“our assumption is that food prices most directly affect the individual. Thus, we 
analyze the low-level events that are most likely to follow an economic grievance 
against the government” (Ibid., p.311, emphasis added). “Food prices […] belong 
to this category of micro-economic indicators of well-being and provide a more 
direct assessment of the scarcity (or perceived scarcity) of food than any other 
indicator” (Ibid., p.312, emphasis added). Finally, Raleigh et al. (2015) investigate 
the relationship between disaggregated African market prices and violent conflict. 
In their paper they state that “the main mechanisms linking commodity prices to 
multiple forms of political violence is increased grievances due to scarcity, or 
opportunities for income generation” (Ibid., p.188, emphasis added).
A related set of studies has investigated the causal relationships between 
population growth, density and demographic composition, and the emergence 
of social disorder events. Urdal and Hoelscher (2012), for example, analyze the 
relationship between national-level youth bulges and social disorder events (e.g. 
demonstrations, strikes, riots, acts of terrorism) in major Asian and African cities. 
They argue that youth bulges may lead to economic exclusion and unemployment 
of youths (due to the effect on the labour market, among other things), which in 
turn may motivate people to participate in social disorder events and/or lower their 
opportunity costs of engaging in protests and riots. In another study, Buhaug and 
Urdal (2013) investigate the relationship between city level population growth and 
urban social unrest. In their theoretical section, they argue that “economic shocks 
in the form of recession or stagnation of the national economy [in combination 
with unmatched urban growth] could accentuate differences in and importance 
of economic privileges between individuals and groups, thus raising levels of 
dissatisfaction and grievances to the extent that it could spur violent reactions” 
(Ibid., p.5, emphasis added). 
Social disorder events have also been linked to climatological issues and changes. 
Hendrix and Salehyan (2012) have investigated the relationship between rainfall 
variability and the occurrence of social disorder events in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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The authors stress the importance of individual grievances as a basis for conflict. 
In particular, they argue that rainfall decreases may lead to higher food prices, 
which in turn may cause discontent and social protests. However, the authors also 
consider other explanations for the possible increase in social conflicts: i.e. rainfall 
shocks may negatively affect public finances and diminish a state’s capacity to 
deter social disorder events or diminish their capacity to distribute resources aimed 
at avoiding conflicts. Yeeles (2015) has also investigated the relationship between 
meteorological changes and social disturbances in 50 major cities in Africa and 
Asia between 1960 and 2006. He argues that there are several causal pathways 
between climate change and conflict, including macro-economic effects and the 
inability of the state to control conflict, scarcity-fuelled grievances, and increased 
anger and aggression due to exposure to higher temperatures. 
In sum, it is common practice in the current literature on social disorder in 
the developing world to test theories that rest on individual-level processes by 
analyzing contextual-level indicators.
social disorder within the literature on contentious politics
In terms of theory and statistical modelling, recent scarcity and social disorder 
studies largely mirror the approaches taken in most quantitative civil-war studies. 
Indeed, some of the scarcity measures, as well as control variables, seem to be di-
rectly derived from past studies on armed conflict (e.g. rainfall variability (Miguel, 
Satyanath & Sergenti, 2004) and youth bulges (Urdal, 2004)). Yet, as many studies 
focus on (violent) protest mobilization, one can also draw insights from the social 
movement literature, which although often focused on Western contexts, holds 
important theoretical and methodological insights to understand conflict mobiliza-
tion in the developing world.
When interpreted against the background of major theoretical developments 
in the social movement literature, it emerges that current social disorder studies 
correspond strongly to early motivational approaches to the study of conflict that 
arose after the Second World War. In various well-known studies, contention was 
mainly seen as the product of specific psychological states. In Kornhauser’s (1961) 
mass society theory, for example, participation in mass movements, in particular the 
Nazi party machinery, was a sign of individual anomie, caused by the weakening 
of social ties in society. For Smelser (1968), collective behavior was argued to be 
the result of perceived structural strain (e.g. the threat of economic deprivation) 
due to rapid changes in society that excite feelings of anxiety, fantasy or hostility. 
Turner and Killian (1959) similarly saw collective behavior as a result of changes 
in societal conditions, which cause individual uncertainty and collective behaviour 
through social contagion. 
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Probably the best-known micro-explanation for collective contention makes 
use of the ‘relative deprivation’ concept. Gurr (1974), for example, argued that 
individuals decide to engage in political violence when ‘their value capabilities are 
not compatible with their value expectations’, namely when they experience ‘rela-
tive deprivation’. Gurr mainly reacted against the claim that political violence is 
a simple reaction to ‘objective’ poverty or hardship, and argued for a ‘subjective’ 
grievance account (sense of injustice) of political mobilization. The relative dep-
rivation approach incorporated other well-known theories such as the frustration-
aggression theory (Berkowitz, 1965) and Davies’ (1962) theory of rising expecta-
tions or the ‘J-curve’ model.
Coleman (1990) illustrated clearly how some of these early motivational 
approaches to conflict used macro-level relations to underpin their micro-level 
theories. From his perspective of methodological individualism, however, this is 
considered to be bad practice, as causal explanation of macro-level phenomena 
requires that social scientists uncover the micro-level mechanisms via which the 
macro-link substantiates (Hedström & Swedberg, 1998). Coleman’s boat-diagram 
(Figure 1) illustrates this point. The most important message of this model is that 
a macro event X cannot be linked directly to another macro-level outcome Y, but 
instead presupposes a causal pathway at the micro level. One example given by 
Coleman to illustrate possible micro and macro-level pathways of causal influence 
dealt with the empirical finding that revolutions often seemed to occur in contexts 
of positive social change (cfr. Davies’s theory of rising expectations). The counter-
intuitive macro-level relationship between positive change and revolutions could 
only be understood by taking the causal pathway via individual-level variables 
into account: Improved social conditions (Macro X) may lead to frustration among 
some people in society (Micro X), because they feel relatively deprived and/or 
excluded from the benefits of progress. In turn, psychological theory suggests that 
frustration may lead to a higher propensity for aggression (Micro Y), which on 
aggregation may result in a social outcome such as a revolution (Macro Y). Such 
a theoretical proposition, therefore assumes that the frustrations of individuals 
who are not advancing in a society are mobilized, and that these persons will 
collectively start a revolutionary movement. For methodological individualists, 
every theoretical macro-macro relation presupposes a micro-level causal process, 
which needs to be empirically substantiated. Therefore, Davies’ theory of rising 
expectations cannot solely be supported by empirical evidence of the macro-level 
relation (1), but also needs to be proven by macro-micro (2), micro-micro (3), and 
micro-macro (4) empirical relations.
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figure 1: Coleman’s Boat
Subsequent research on social movements in the West had a stronger empirical 
focus on the micro-micro link (relationship 3 in Coleman’s boat diagram). This 
revealed that individuals participating in conflict events were not necessarily the 
most frustrated or aggrieved, but had access to the resources (capital and labour) 
needed to mobilize people and organize a movement. These findings gave rise 
to the resource mobilization paradigm in social movement studies (McCarthy & 
Zald, 1977). Similarly, the political process perspective on protest mobilization 
holds that people take into consideration how authorities will react to opposition 
(e.g. repression) and only engage in collective action when they perceive an 
opportunity for this to be successful (McAdam, McCarthy & Mayer, 1999; Opp, 
2009). In other words, empirical focus on the micro-level revealed that grievance-
based theoretical assumptions derived from macro-level relations were not always 
supported.
Further advances in the social movement literature brought attention back to 
the psychological mechanisms of individual mobilization, but in more complex 
and nuanced ways than the earlier grievance-based approach had done. Indeed, 
these mechanisms also came to include emotions (e.g. Jasper and Poulsen, 
1995) as well as social identities (e.g. De Weerd and Klandermans, 1999). In 
sum, methodological advances on protest mobilization in Western contexts have 
allowed scholars to theorize and unravel further the intricate causal mechanisms 
underlying mobilization. Studies on conflict in the developing world, however, 
continue to focus predominantly on individual-level grievance theory, combined 
with macro-level research designs.
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unDErstAnDIng AnD InvEstIgAtIng EcoLogIcAL fALLAcIEs In thE 
confLIct LItErAturE
Debates on the ecological fallacy
The concept of an ecological fallacy was defined by Selvin (1958, p.613) as 
a situation in which “relationships between characteristics of individuals are 
wrongly inferred from data about groups.” Indeed, Coleman’s boat shows clearly 
that analyzing relations between macro-level phenomena while empirically 
ignoring individual-level linkages creates serious risks. The problem of studying 
ecological correlations knows several sides, however. A first issue is of a statistical 
nature, and is concerned with reconstituting individual-level relations from 
aggregated data. In his seminal study on ecological correlations, Robinson (1950) 
demonstrated how the correlation between the percentage of Blacks and illiteracy 
rates in American states differs from the individual correlation between race 
and illiteracy. He concluded that the study of ecological correlations should be 
abandoned for a research agenda focusing on the properties of individuals. More 
recently, King (1997) has proposed a statistical method to improve the validity of 
correlations based on aggregated data for individual-level inferences. A broader 
understanding of ecological fallacy problems does not only focus on macro-level 
aggregates of individual-level data (e.g. illiteracy rates or voting percentages), 
however, but also on variables that are solely measured at the macro-level (e.g. 
GDP/capita or government debt). The extent to which relationships between 
macro-level variables, whether they are aggregates or only measured at the macro-
level, can be used to infer individual-level causal mechanisms constitutes the 
broader theoretical problem of ecological fallacies that concerns us here.
The main argument against macro-level modelling is that macro-level relations 
do not exist in their own right, but presume an individual-level dynamic that should 
be investigated empirically (Coleman, 1990; Hedström & Swedberg, 1998). This 
position of methodological individualism is also supported by Kittel (2006), 
who argues that a macro-level relationship between globalization (as measured, 
for example, by Foreign Direct Investments) and higher social expenditures can 
be explained or theorized in different ways through the behavior of individuals. 
However, without micro-level evidence, it is not possible to test these explanations 
and defend one over the other. According to Kittel, macro-level modelling, hence, 
holds little theory-testing value. Importantly, this does not mean that individual-
level inferences from macro-relations are necessarily erroneous; instead, the 
presence of ecological fallacies can only be reliably established by analyzing the 
hypothesized relations at the individual level.
In a nuanced defense of ecological studies, however, Schwartz (1994) points out 
that ecological correlations may be more valid than individual-level ones in specific 
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circumstances. Firstly, ecological data may be more accurate than individual-level 
data if the latter are prone to bias (i.e. recall bias and social desirability bias). 
Drawing on examples from public health research, she argues for instance that sales 
of alcoholic beverages or rates of abortions may be more useful than statements 
of alcohol use or an individual’s abortion experience. Ecological correlations may, 
hence, be warranted if there are good reasons to assume individual-level data is 
prone to error.
Secondly, Schwartz (1994) disputes a methodological individualist viewpoint 
that all macro-level relations suppose an underlying micro-level causal mechanism 
and argues that the locus of attention may also be group-level variables and macro-
level processes as such. Ecological data should not necessarily be seen as a rough 
substitute for individual-level data, but can measure unique contextual concepts 
and relations. Drawing on an example from Zito (1975 in Schwartz, 1994), who 
argues that a hung jury does not exist out of indecisive members, yet rather very 
decided ones who simply disagree, she asserts that some variables only exist at 
a group level, and that the relationship between such variables may be an important 
point of scientific interest.
Finally, and related to the previous argument, Schwartz (1994) warns of 
the ‘individualistic fallacy’ or the view that macro-level variables do not have 
explanatory value for the behaviour of individuals in and of themselves. Indeed, 
context matters for the behaviour of individuals, and ecological or group-level 
variables may hold explanatory power for micro-level outcomes. It is important 
to clarify, however, that the individualistic fallacy critique is not necessarily 
a straightforward defence of macro-level relational studies. While group-level 
variables may be used as explanatory factors, the dependent variable is generally 
measured at the individual level. This is the case for multilevel studies in particular 
(e.g. Coleman, 1990, Greenland, 2001; Subramanian et al., 2009). 
Below, we demonstrate how these arguments in favour of and against ecological 
studies can be applied to civil-war studies and, in turn, recent social disorder studies.
Ecological fallacies in conflict studies
The ecological fallacy debate has been waged in the fields of epidemiology (e.g. 
Greenland, 2001; Schwartz, 1994) and sociology (Coleman, 1990; Hedström 
& Swedberg, 1998; Kittel, 2006), but unfortunately has not been dealt with in 
depth in conflict studies. Nevertheless, arguably one of the clearest examples of 
a possible ecological fallacy in conflict research relates to Collier and Hoeffler’s 
(2002) highly influential paper on greed versus grievance motivations for 
participation in armed rebellion. In this paper the authors interpret the negative 
and significant relationship between GDP/capita and the outbreak of civil war as 
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evidence in support of their hypothesis that individuals are rational and ‘greedy’, 
hence poorer individuals are more likely to join rebel groups because they face 
lower opportunity costs. Furthermore, they use Polity III regime type and Freedom 
House scores to investigate whether individual political grievances determine the 
onset of civil war, but find no statistical association.
According to Collier (2001), the use of macro-level modelling to approach the 
question of why people join rebel movements is warranted because reliable data 
about the true motivations of individuals cannot be collected. Therefore, he argues 
for a focus on ‘revealed preferences’ by investigating the macro-level. This argument 
corresponds to Schwartz’s (19994) view that individual data are not always reliable. 
Yet by only relying on the abstract rational choice notion of the ‘homo economicus’ 
(Cramer, 2002)1, l’homme moyenne, or the representative agent (Kittel, 2006) at 
the micro-level, Collier & Hoeffler (2002) risk wrongfully inferring micro-level 
dynamics from ecological correlations. Indeed, several studies on rebel motivations 
have added nuance to Collier’s greed argument by relying on survey data (e.g. 
Langer & Ukiwo, 2013; Humphreys & Weinstein, 2008).
In an equally influential study on the determinants of civil war, Fearon and Laitin 
(2003) make use of many of the same variables, but provide a different interpretation. 
They find the same significant relationship between the onset of civil war and GDP/
capita, but argue instead that GDP/capita is a measure of a state’s strength and 
its ability to deter rebels. They also use Polity IV scores to measure ‘anocracies’, 
regimes that mix democratic and authoritarian characteristics, and find that their 
presence increases the risk of the outbreak of war. As with GDP/capita, the anocracy 
variable is seen as a measure of state capacity. Therefore, Fearon & Laitin (2003) 
‘resolve’ the ecological fallacy problem by theorizing relationships at the macro-
level rather than through individual dynamics, in line with Schwartz’s (1994) second 
argument in defence of ecological correlations. In a subsequent paper, Collier and 
his collaborators re-theorized their arguments in a similar way (Collier, Hoeffler & 
Rohner, 2008). They now argue that it is the opportunity to rebel, operationalized in 
terms of state weakness and proxied by the level of GDP/capita, which determines 
which countries will have a civil war and which ones will not.2
The papers by Collier and Hoeffler (2002) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) have 
had a profound impact on both theory and methodology in civil-war studies and 
are also a source of inspiration for many social disorder studies. Yet the rationale 
for using macro-level modelling for social disorder studies is less defensible in 
two important respects. First of all, most studies argue that a relationship between 
scarcity factors and protest events at the macro-level can be explained through 
individual economic grievances leading to protest participation (see Section 2). 
This means that they explicitly rely on micro-level theory rather than macro-level 
theory as Fearon & Laitin (2003) and later Collier et al. (2008) did.3 Secondly, 
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while Collier (2001) argues that macro-level modelling is necessitated by the 
relative dearth of reliable individual-level data in countries ravaged by civil war, 
information about individual participation in low-level social disorder events, 
in particular protests and riots, is commonly gathered through opinion polls and 
surveys. Especially in western settings, determinants of protest participation have 
been addressed by means of survey research (Andretta & della Porta, 2014). These 
types of data sources may also provide interesting insights in developing settings. 
Indeed, they could reveal different mobilization dynamics than supposed by 
macro-level relations, as illustrated below.
EMpIrIcAL ILLustrAtIon
hypotheses and Data
Based on examples from quantitative social disorder studies, as well as Collier and 
Hoeffler’s (2002) seminal paper, two theoretical models are formulated in which 
a macro-macro relationship relies on a micro-level causal link. The macro-macro 
and micro-micro links are subsequently tested empirically and contrasted. The first 
model states that poorer countries are likely to witness more protest events, because 
poorer, and hence more aggrieved, people are more likely to engage in protests. 
The second model holds that less democratic regimes are likely to experience 
more protests because people who rate their country as not being a democracy are 
more likely to engage in protests in order to voice their discontent about the lack 
of political participation, transparency and accountability.
The formulation of these hypotheses is necessarily influenced by data availability. 
Several datasets on protest and riot events in Africa are currently available, 
including, for example, the PRIO Urban Social Disturbance in Africa and Asia 
database (Urdal, 2008), the Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD) (Saleyhan at 
al., 2012), and the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED) (Raleigh 
et al., 2010). These datasets are primarily based on news stories and reports (e.g. 
Keesing’s Record of World Events, Lexis-Nexis, AllAfrica etc.) Here we compare 
ACLED data on protest counts (version 5) with the Afrobarometer survey question 
on protest participation.4 Since the end of the 1990s, the Afrobarometer Project 
has conducted surveys concerning citizens’ political attitudes and behaviour in 
selected African countries. For the present analyses, data from Round 5 are used. 
ACLED event counts of protests and riots (as the Afrobarometer question may 
refer to both) are constructed for the 12-month period prior to the last interview 
date in any country survey. Events are included if actors are defined as ‘Protesters’ 
or ‘Rioters’. Events are also limited to events in which protesters and rioters were 
internal actors (as the Afrobarometer project only questions national citizens).5
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For the macro-level independent variables GNI per capita (World Development 
Indicators) and the Polity IV regime-type scores are used. Data are taken for the 
year of the last interview date of a country’s Afrobarometer survey. At the micro-
level, a person’s individual welfare and the degree to which a respondent sees 
his/her country as a democracy are used. Both variables are derived from the 
Afrobarometer surveys. Table 1 describes all variables. 






A protest describes a non-violent, group 
public demonstration, often against 
a government institution. Rioting is 









The POLITY score is computed by sub-
tracting the AUTOC (autocracy) score 
from the DEMOC (democracy) score 
Scale from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10
(strongly autocratic)
MICRO-LEVEL: Survey data





Here is a list of actions that people 
sometimes take as citizens. For each of 
these, please tell me whether you, per-
sonally, have done any of these things 
during the past year. If not, would you 
do this if you had the chance: Attended 
a demonstration or protest march?
0=No, would never 
do this
1=No, but would do if 
had the chance







Over the past year, how often, if ever, 
have you or anyone in your family gone 
without:
Enough food to eat?
Enough clean water for home use?








Economic index: sum of 
5 items * (-1)
(Note: multiplied by -1 
to match the direction 






In your opinion how much of a democ-
racy is Benin/Ghana/… today?
1=Not a democracy
2=A democracy, with 
major problems
3=A democracy, but 
with minor problems
4=A full democracy
0= Not a democracy or 
one with major prob-
lems
1= a democracy or one 
with minor problems
a. Missing cases, refusals, and ‘don’t know’ answers are left out of the analyses.
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The critical analysis of the common practice of testing micro-level (grievance) 
theory by making use of macro-level data and analysis relies on a comparison of 
the direction and significance of the macro-macro relations (arrow 1 in Coleman’s 
boat) with the micro-micro-relations (arrow 3 in Coleman’s boat) that are theoreti-
cally associated with them. In the two theoretical models used here, GNI/capita 
and Polity IV are the ‘Macro X’ variables, while protest event count is the ‘Macro 
Y’. For the underlying micro-relations, individual economic index and individual 
democracy rating are the ‘Micro X’ with protest participation as ‘Micro Y’. After 
demonstrating that different relations may hold on the macro-macro and micro-
micro levels, we further analyze the reasons for this mismatch by focusing on the 
macro-micro (arrow 2) and micro-macro (arrow 4) relations. 
Of course, additional factors besides the ones used in the analyses can determine 
protest event occurrence as well as participation. Most quantitative social disorder 
studies use quite a number of control variables. At the individual level as well, 
factors such as gender and educational level can be significant predictors of protest 
participation. However, the models are limited to the variables described above to 
allow testing them in a straightforward manner. 
Finally, it is also important to note that both the survey data and event data 
can be subject to error. Possible survey errors may be due to recall effects (i.e. 
difficulties in remembering protest participation in a certain time period) and social 
desirability bias (the respondent is unwilling to acknowledge protest participation). 
Event data can be subject to selection bias if not all events which actually occurred 
are included in the media reports on which event datasets are based (Earl et al., 
2004). These problems further attest to the difficulties of modelling and theorizing 
at different levels of analysis, however, and further contribute to the argument 
made here.
results
First, two models based on macro-level data and two corresponding models based 
on micro-level data are tested. The total number of observations at the macro-level 
is 30, the total number of observations at the micro-level is 42526. We conduct 
complete case analyses. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics. 
As the macro-level dependent variable is a count variable, negative binomial 
regressions are used. For the micro-models, logistic regressions are used in a multi-
level framework to account for the country-clustering of the data. Table 3 shows 
the results of the macro-macro models.
Model 1 reveals a positive relationship between GNI/capita and the number 
of protest events for the sample of Afrobarometer countries. Following the first 
theoretical model, this could indicate that because the macro-macro relationship is 
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not negative as supposed, this means that the micro-micro causal link, namely that 
poorer people are more likely to participate in protests, is also not supported. Model 
2 shows a negative relationship between regime type score and protest events. This 
could support the second theoretical model and its supposed micro-micro link, 
namely that people who are dissatisfied with the regime are more likely to protest.
The dangers of supposing micro-level dynamics from macro-level relations 
are demonstrated in the micro-micro models, however (Table 4). Model 3 shows 
that a respondent’s individual economic index is negatively related to protest 
participation. The initially hypothesized micro-level dynamic – poorer people 
are more likely to participate in protests –  therefore receives some support from 
the data. Hence, the macro-level analysis could not be relied upon to inform us 
about individual beliefs and behaviours. Model 4 reveals that people who rate their 
country as not being a democracy are also more likely to participate in a protest. 
Interestingly, this relationship runs in the same direction as the macro-level 
table 2: Descriptive statistics
variable na Mean standard 
Deviation
Minimum Maximum
ACLED event counts 30 52.73 108.89 0 595
ln GNI/cap 30 7.86 0.91 6.59 9.60
Polity IV 30 3.40 4.60 -9 9
Protest participation 42526 0.09 0.30 0 1
Economic Index 42526 -6.58 5.017 -20 0
Democracy rating 42526 0.57 0.52 0 1
a. Cape Verde and Mauritius are not included in our analysis because there is no information in ACLED for 
these countries. Tunisia is also dropped from our analysis because there is no Polity IV score available. 
Across-weights are applied for the descriptive statistics of the micro-level variables.
table 3: Macro-macro model results
Dependent: ACLED event counts





*** p<.01; ** p<.05 
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relation. This supports the second theoretical model and also shows that individual-
level assumptions based on macro-level relations are not necessarily incorrect. 
However, when left untested, they remain tentative and potentially flawed.
table 4: Micro-micro model results
Dependent: Afrobarometer protest participation






Within variance 3.29 3.29
Between variance 0.061 0.062
N (2nd level) 30 30
N 42526 42526
*** p<.01; ** p<.05 
table 5: Macro-micro model results
Model 5  
(dep.: Individual 
economic index)






Within variance 1.927 3.29
Between variance 18.014 0.092
N (2nd level) 30 30
N 42526 42526
*** p<.01; ** p<.05 
While the foregoing has demonstrated how different relations may hold on 
different levels of analysis, we investigate this mismatch further by empirically 
analyzing how the macro and micro-level are related to each other. Our theoretical 
models proposed that poorer countries had poorer, more aggrieved people, while 
less democratic countries had more politically aggrieved people. This causal 
reasoning corresponds to the second arrow in Coleman’s boat. We analyze these 
relations through multilevel models reported in Table 5. The results appear to 
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indicate that, indeed, people are less well off in countries with a lower GDP/capita, 
and that people are more likely to rate their country as not democratic in countries 
with low Polity scores. While these relations are not perfect, there is empirical 
support for the macro-micro links in the theoretical models.
The micro-macro relations in our theoretical models are more difficult to analyze 
statistically (see Bennink, Croon & Vermunt, 2013). However, as regression is in 
essence a correlational analysis, we analyze arrow 4 in Coleman’s boat model here 
through a multi-level model with protest participation as dependent and ACLED 
event counts as independent. Table 6 shows clearly that there is no relationship 
between these variables. The hypothesized theoretical relation between protest 
participation and protest events therefore lacks support. While this may be due to 
measurement error, there are also important conceptual reasons for the mismatch 
between both variables. Indeed, the number of protest events is not necessarily linked 
to a large number of participants, as protest events can be staged by a small number 
of organizations, with a relatively small, yet highly motivated, group of supporters. 
table 6: Micro-macro model results






N (2nd level) 30 
N 42526
*** p<.01; ** p<.05 
Given that there is no empirical support for the hypothesized micro-macro link 
between protest participation and events, we can also deduce that the empirical 
correspondence of the macro-macro relation between Polity and protest events 
and the micro-micro relation between perceptions of democracy and protest 
participation are not due to the hypothesized causal mechanism.
concLusIons AnD LEssons for furthEr rEsEArch
This paper has focused on the risk of ecological fallacies in the quantitative study of 
social disorder events in the developing world. Similar to civil-war studies, many 
quantitative disorder studies use macro-level modelling techniques to regress event 
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data on indicators of resource scarcity for a given country or sub-national area, 
while at the same time relying on individual-level hypotheses to substantiate this 
link theoretically. However, leaving these micro-level dynamics unaddressed can 
pose problems for the validity of the research results. As illustrated empirically by 
making use of macro- as well as micro-level data, individual relationships inferred 
from macro-level analyses are not necessarily supported when testing them in their 
own right.
The rationale for using macro-level empirical data to investigate micro-level 
processes in quantitative civil-war studies was mainly driven by a lack of reliable 
individual-level data in these settings. Nonetheless, recent advances in this field 
of study have emphasized the importance of investigating and gathering data on 
micro-dynamics (Balcells & Justino, 2014). For social disorder events as well, 
further empirical inquiry into individual mobilization processes is necessary. 
Moreover, data collection in these low-level conflict settings is arguably more 
feasible.
The study of individual participation in protests and riots in the developing 
world can in particular draw on the social movement literature, which has, for now, 
focused predominantly on Western countries. Several survey designs to investigate 
protests are possible; for example, the study of protest participation in general in 
a nationally representative survey or the study of protest participation in a specific 
protest event (Andretta & della Porta, 2014). The latter can be investigated by 
conducting a survey during the event or by surveying an area where participants are 
known to originate from. Cross-national variations in protest participation and the 
effect of macro-level variables on individual behavior can also be tested via multi-
level models (e.g. Christensen, 2016). To fully understand participation, it is also 
necessary that grievances are questioned (and not inferred from socio-demographic 
characteristics), as well as social capital (resources), and perceptions of political 
opportunity structures. These issues can also be addressed in experimental designs 
(Van Zomeren et al., 2004). 
Micro-focused research designs are indeed largely absent from the current 
literature on social disorder in the developing world. Some examples include Resnick 
and Casale’s (2011) study on protest participation by means of Afrobarometer data, 
or Scacco’s (2008) study of ethnic riots in Jos, Nigeria. Interestingly, both studies 
provide evidence that resource mobilization and network contacts are important 
determinants of contentious actions. Hence, in developing settings as well, these 
theoretical approaches and types of data can improve in-depth understanding of 
protest mobilization.
The foregoing does not imply that the study of protest events should be 
abandoned. This macro-level approach may still be defensible if researchers are 
mainly interested in group-level processes (Schwartz, 1994). Sutton, Butcher, and 
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Svensson (2014), for instance, investigate to what extent group-level characteristics 
of protest events (e.g. their level of organization) lead to a violent response from 
the state. However, if the underlying theory for a macro-macro relation is situated 
at the micro-level, the methodological individualist perspective rightly emphasizes 
the importance that researchers clarify that the underlying individual dynamics 
are tentative and not tested within the research design. In the same vein, one has 
to exercise extreme care when inferring causal pathways at the micro-level from 
macro-level empirical data and associations.
notEs
1  In his well-known critique on the work of Collier and Hoeffler, Cramer (2002) argues 
that Collier makes use of theories based on methodological individualism and, indeed, 
economic rational choice theory is the starting point of their work. However, Collier and 
Hoeffler do not use the data and methods prescribed by methodological individualists, 
such as Robinson and Coleman. By not empirically testing the posited causal relations at 
the micro-level, Collier and Hoeffler stand far apart from the methodological individualist 
perspective.
2  It can be argued, however, that this macro-relationship also presupposes an individual 
link, namely that individuals see and evaluate state capacity and adjust their actions 
accordingly. This discussion was also held in the social movement literature, where 
political opportunities are often measured by the researcher at the macro-level and then 
related to protest events (e.g. Kriesi et al., 1998). Critical voices have argued that this 
research design neglects the individual and his/her perceptions of political opportunities 
(McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1999, p.8; Opp, 2009, pp. 167–171).
3  Some authors also combine micro- and macro-level theory. Hendrix and Salehyan (2012), 
for instance, argue that rainfall shocks may lead to grievances as well as diminished state 
capacity.
4  ACLED’s protest event definition corresponds closely to the Afrobarometer understanding 
of protest activity as a public demonstration. For different understandings between event 
and survey data on protest activity, see Biggs (2015). It is also important to note that if 
a protest lasts for multiple days, each day is counted as an event in ACLED, which also 
has implications for assumptions on the number of participants.
5  Some protests are found in the ACLED event category ‘Violence against civilians’ 
and not the category ‘Protest/Riot’. By relying on actor specifications we, can also 
include these cases. We also browsed ACLED for events identifying one of the actors as 
international or with a nationality foreign to the country (based on the Actor and notes 
variables) and excluded these events from the analyses.
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